Landmarks in territory partitioning: a strategically stable convention?
A convention is a rule based on arbitrary cues that allows quick resolution of potentially protracted disputes. A familiar example is the Bourgeois strategy, in which the second of two animals to discover a resource yields it to the first, even though it may be stronger than its opponent. Here we develop a game-theoretic model to show that neighbors with imperfect information about one another's fighting abilities can be favored to accept a landmark as the designator of a territory boundary, even when the resulting territory is smaller than the one that would have been won through fighting. Thus, the use of landmarks or other mutually obvious solutions can serve as a convention for territory partitioning. For a distribution of fighting ability with low variance and high skew, there is a remarkably high probability that an animal will accept a smaller territory than it would have won through fighting. The analysis provides a possible explanation for the observed use of landmarks as boundary markers by territorial animals in a variety of taxa, including birds, fish, insects, and mammals. The analysis also suggests why territory boundaries are stable, once established, despite changes in characteristics of the residents or the environment.